by Silke Heinz
On December 30, 2021, the Federal Cartel Office has decided that Google has paramount significance for competition across markets in Germany under Section 19a ARC. Accordingly, Google is now subject to the new special abuse control rules for large digital companies. Silke Heinz has published a guest commentary (in German) in the legal journal Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 02/2022, see here.
The FCO has published a press release on the decision (in English), see here.
The decision has also been published by now (only in German), see here
by Silke Heinz
The renown business magazine brand eins lists Heinz & Zagrosek among the top commercial law firms in Germany in 2021, see here.
We are very happy about the recognition and thank all clients and competitors who have voted for us.
by Silke Heinz
Heinz & Zagrosek has been recognized as one of the top antitrust/competition law firms in Germany in several rankings this year: renowned magazines brandeins, Wirtschaftswoche, Focus as well as Handelsblatt/Best Lawyers all rank partner Silke Heinz and the law firm Heinz & Zagrosek among the top antitrust lawyers in Germany. We are very pleased and would like to thank everyone for the great feedback! This provides us with even more motivation to continuously aim at producing excellent work, offer tailor-made services to our clients and become even better!
(Here are links to the rankings.)
by Silke Heinz
Silke Heinz gave a short speech on the topic Competition law compliance and digitization at the webconference Legal & Compliance Forum on April 30, 2020. She speaks about the recent tendencies of competition authorities pursuing hardcore restrictions in vertical supply relations and horizontal cartels, including on the role of technological developments in the digital economy. At the end, Ms. Heinz talks about the role of algorithms, how competition authorities view these and presents conclusions for compliance work. You can find a video of the speech here (in German)
by Roman Zagrosek
The Company as Perpetrator, Compliance and M&A under the Planned German Corporate Criminal Sanctions Code.
Germany law does not yet provide for a corporate criminal liability in general. For anti-trust law, similar corporate criminal provisions compared to those now planned in general do already exist. The level of fines will be much higher than in the past (up to 10% of worldwide group revenues) and violations must be prosecuted, there is no more discretion. The new law shall also provide for successor liability which in M&A transactions may cause the Buyer to be responsible in addition to the Target and the Seller. Indemnities and remedies against future losses as well as careful structuring of transactions is required. The publication is published in Revista de Direito Comercial, 2019, and available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3496803.
Both authors have also published an article about this topic in German in: Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (ZIP), 2019, Heft 50/S. 2385, Knott/Zagrosek, „Das Unternehmen als Täter – Compliance-Fragen bei M&A Transaktionen nach dem geplanten Unternehmensstrafrecht“.
by Silke Heinz
Silke Heinz discusses the recently opened EU Amazon antitrust proceedings in a podcast of the ABA Antitrust Law Section’s series “Our Curious Amalgam”, together with the other guest, Damien Geradin, and the hosts Matthew Hall and John Roberti. The discussion covers inter alia the impact of Amazon’s dual role as operator of the Amazon marketplace and as retailer active on the same platform, the information/data collection aspects of the case, and possible lessons for the digital economy. You can listen to the podcast here.
by Roman Zagrosek
On July 9, 2019, the Supreme Court (here) quashed the decision of the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf, which had increased the fine for retailer Rossmann from EUR 5.25 million to EUR 30 million on the basis of vertical price agreements in the sale of roasted coffee, and referred it back for a new decision. A formal error caused the annulment and referral: The grounds of the Higher Regional Court Düsseldorf’s judgement were not placed on file in due time after the judgement had been delivered at the end of the main oral hearing.
The Supreme Court only marginally commented on issues of substance as the formal error is a so-called absolute ground for appeal, which results in the judgement being set aside in its entirety. Rossmann had argued that the limitation period for the cartel infringement had already expired. The Supreme Court confirmed the Court of Appeal’s finding that there had been a single and continuous cartel infringement, consisting of a basic agreement and acts of implementation. According to the findings of the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf, the infringement had not yet ended by February 2008. The decision of the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf of February 28, 2018 had therefore interrupted the (10 years) statute of limitations in due time.
However, the Supreme Court did not comment on the calculation of the fine by the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf that had led to a six-times higher fine than the fine originally imposed by the Federal Cartel Office.
In 2016, the German Federal Cartel Office found that roasted coffee manufacturer Melitta and several retailers had entered into vertical price agreements between 2004 and 2008 to maintain a minimum level of retail prices for roasted coffee products, and had imposed fines of EUR 5.25 million on Rossmann (see the case summary in German here )
While all other parties settled the proceedings with the Federal Cartel Office, Rossmann appealed the fine.
In 2018, the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf increased the fine against Rossmann to EUR 30 million (Case No. 4 Kart 3/17 OWi, here ). In calculating the fine, the court took the group-wide turnover as the basis instead of the turnover involved in the infringement, which the Federal Cartel Office is using for the calculation, and assessed the severity of the act and the guilt level. Rossmann then appealed to the Supreme Court.
by Roman Zagrosek
On July 17, 2019 the BKartA announced the settlement with Amazon and closed the abuse of dominance proceedings. Besides a press release (here), it also published a case summary (here). On the same day, the European Commission opened an investigation into possible anti-competitive conduct of Amazon (here).
Heinz & Zagrosek has been representing a dealer of sewing machines as complainant in the German proceedings.
The BKartA investigated Amazon’s liability provisions; termination and blocking of seller accounts; court of jurisdiction (competent court only in Luxembourg); returns and reimbursement; product information and rights of use; confidentiality; transparency; product reviews and seller ratings; etc.
The fact that the BKartA could convince Amazon to change and amend its t&cs in a relatively short period (compared to other abuse of dominance proceedings the case has been closed within ca. 7 months) is very positive. It is quite remarkable that the FCO could obtain a global solution, i.e., not only limited to Germany, the territory of its jurisdiction. The amendments seem to cover most of the complaint topics, but of course it will be crucial how Amazon will implement these promised changes in reality. The devil may well be in the details in this respect, and the FCO is willing to reopen proceedings should Amazon fall short of properly implementing the changes.
In Germany, the proceedings were not predominantly about its dual role as platform provider and dealer – that is now the subject of the European Commission proceedings – but more about exploitative abuse of dealers active on the platform through imposing unfair trading terms.
But the case also involved impeding and foreclosing dealers, in particular through leveraging its dominant platform position into its own retail sales: Amazon only allows product reviews to be posted on its platform if generated by its own “Amazon Vine” service, not by third-party review service providers. At the same time, it prevents platform dealers from using the Vine service, which is only available for suppliers of Amazon’s own retail activities (vendors).
Here Amazon has now promised to grant access to the Amazon Vine service to more dealers and offer services for the review of new products, which is very positive. However, the BKartA did not decide on how to deal with Amazon prohibiting the posting of product reviews from third-party services and the retroactive deletion of already posted reviews, which also formed part of complaint and concerns legitimate investments made by dealers in this area. The BKartA did obviously not want to hold up the overall informal “settlement” package and therefore refrained from reviewing these aspects in depth. Instead, it will await the results of the currently ongoing user review sector inquiry (see our blog here), which also touches upon the subject. The topic is still very important for online dealers. The devil may well be in the details in this respect, and the BKartA is willing to reopen proceedings should Amazon fall short of properly implementing the changes.
It is not unusual that the national competition agencies and the European Commission coordinate the scope and timing of their proceedings – given that there are parallel competences in applying EU competition law, while the Commission may ultimately take over a case. Here it was efficient to coordinate the substance, so as to avoid the agencies reviewing the same questions in substance.
Heinz & Zagrosek has been mentioned and also cited in Juve (here) and GCR (here) in connection with the settlement of the German abuse proceedings against Amazon.
by Silke Heinz
On July 9, 2019, the Commission imposed a fine of €6.2 million on Sanrio, manufacturer of Hello-Kitty-products, for vertical sales restrictions (see press release here).
Sanrio licenses its brand and other IP rights for use in several Hello Kitty merchandising products in the EEA. In the (non-exclusive) licensing agreements in the EEA, Sanrio prohibited licensees to engage in cross-border sales of the licensed merchandise products, on the one hand by direct means (through clauses explicitly prohibiting these sales, obligations to refer orders for out-of-territory sales to Sanrio and limitations to the languages used on the merchandising products). On the other hand, Sanrio also implemented these prohibitions in an indirect way, i.e., through audits and the non-renewal of contracts if licensees did not comply with the out-of-territory restrictions. The Commission qualified the agreements as market partitioning within the EEA. Typically, market partitioning is viewed as an antitrust infringement by object or as hardcore restriction, which means that for example the vertical block exemption regulation cannot apply, and that relying on an individual exemption is very difficult.
Sanrio cooperated with the Commission and thus obtained a reduction of its fine by 40%. This was a cooperation outside of the leniency notice, which only covers horizontal cartels. In vertical cases, a procedure for cooperation with the Commission has been recently developed and takes place on a similar basis as under the cartel settlement notice. There is an overview on the procedure in a factsheet published on the Guess case (see here).
The case is another example that the Commission investigates and sanctions vertical infringements. This may on the one hand be due to the results of the e-commerce sector inquiry. On the other hand, the Commission seems to seek to take on cases in order not to leave this area of antitrust enforcement to the national competition authorities only. Silke Heinz was quoted to possible reasons and the background to this in Global Competition Review (see here).
by Marc Juncke
On July 2, 2019, the Federal Cartel Office (“FCO”) cleared the acquisition of paper dealer Papyrus (part of OptiGroup) by Papier Union (Inapa group) in second phase, with a combined market share of 40-50% in the printing paper market (see press release in German here).
Even though the shares triggered the presumption of single dominance under German law (40%, Section 18 GWB), the FCO did not expect the creation of single dominance, given that the largest competitor Igepa has an even slightly higher share. The FCO additionally relied on the following: the printing plants as customers operate multi-sourcing, can swiftly and easily switch suppliers, and competitors have sufficient capacity to satisfy additional demand. Finally, the FCO considered direct paper supplies by one paper manufacturer (Sappi) as relative competitive constraint to limit the merging parties’ scope of conduct.
The merging parties’ combined market shares and Igepa also exceed the presumption of collective dominance under German law (more than 2/3). The FCO found that it was not possible to show the creation of coordinated effects with the necessary likelihood, even though the planned merger would render the company and market structure more symmetric, which could facilitate implicit coordination. Pursuant to the FCO, the changing market conditions, the declining overall market size and the outside competition through direct supplies by Sappi spoke against coordinated effects. This shows that despite the collective dominance presumption, the FCO applies a significant evidentiary test in its review.
That the FCO considered the direct supplies, which it viewed as belonging to a separate product market, as a significant competitive constraint, is also interesting. This aspect may also be relevant in other distribution markets, in which there are direct supplies by manufacturers next to supplies by dealers.
